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ABSTRACT
The research presented herein has two objectives. First, this study will test whether actuarial assumptions for public sector pension sche-
mes in Brazil adhere to reality and whether changing these assumptions might affect the results, particularly with respect to life tables 
and wage growth assumptions. The paper shows that the best fit life table is AT 2000 for males aggregated by one year, which involves a 
longer life expectancy than the life table proposed under current legislation (IBGE 2009). The data also show that actual wage growth was 
4.59% per year from 2002 to 2012, as opposed to the 1% wage increase proposed by the same legislation. Changing these two assumptions 
increases the actuarial imbalance for a representative individual by 18.17% after accounting for the adjusted life table or by 98.30% after 
revising the wage growth assumption. With respect to its second objective, this paper proposes alternative funding mechanisms in which 
the local pension scheme will provide the funded component of the benefit that would be complemented by local government in a pay-
-as-you-go manner. The database utilized was for the state of Rio Grande do Sul in the month of November 2011. The results are thus 
restricted to Rio Grande do Sul. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION
The impact of pensions on public finances in Europe 
has been under discussion for some time, although this 
discussion has generally focused on the perspective of the 
general pension system and is not necessarily limited to the 
public employee pensions. For example, Feldstein and Sie-
bert (2002) discuss how 10 European countries faced the 
conflict between generous pension promises and projected 
changes in demographic structure at the beginning of the 
21st century. 
 The pension system in the Brazilian states is organi-
zed into RPPSs and managed by an agency that operates 
all the parts of the system, including the provision and 
maintenance of pension benefits and administration of 
financial resources.
The first major step toward standardizing and developing 
guidelines for the RPPSs was the passage of Act no. 9717 
(1998). Until that time, the lack of regulation allowed the pu-
blic sector pension system to be addressed in a personal and 
intuitive manner, with no minimum or mandatory technical 
evaluation that might illuminate the reality of pension com-
mitments made by the entities that created their own RPPSs.
Shortly thereafter, Ordinance no. 4992 (1999) regulated 
Act no. 9717 (1998) by establishing minimum and maxi-
mum parameters to be used for the RPPS actuarial valu-
ation process. To replace Ordinance no. 4992 (1999), the 
Brazilian Ministry of Social Security (Ministério da Previ-
dência Social - MPS) issued Ordinance no. 403 (2008), whi-
ch establishes new guidelines for parameters acceptable in 
performing actuarial valuations.
The regulatory premise established by Ordinance no. 403 
(2008) with respect to maintaining a pension system with 
financial and actuarial balance in the RPPSs assumes that 
there will be a financial regime to fund the system; however, 
according to Nogueira (2012), this funding has not met the 
levels required to ensure long-term balance.
In a theoretical study on the regulatory policy of Bra-
zilian RPPSs, Calazans and Caetano (2013) claim that the 
substantial number of RPPSs and the sheer size of the coun-
try hinder the regulation of state employee pensions. These 
authors thus propose alternatives – including self-regulation 
and social regulation – as complements to the current ins-
truments of restraint and sanction. According to Avritzer 
(2008), beginning in the 20th century, Brazil has become a 
country with a high degree of participatory propensity, but 
the study does not refer to RPPSs. In turn, Silva, Jaccoud and 
Beghin (2005) point to the limitations of management coun-
cils as decision-making bodies. 
The funding process established for the RPPSs through 
legislative guidelines has origins in the experience of the 
funding of private pension systems, which are called pen-
sion funds. However, there is a striking difference between 
funding part of some remuneration (complementary pen-
sion) structured under the strict rules of a private entity and 
funding the full benefits of public employees who have labor 
relations that are distinct from those of the private sector.
The objective of the present study is to discuss whether 
parameters commonly used in actuarial valuations adhe-
re to reality and how adopting more realistic assumptions 
with respect to these parameters affects actuarial results 
and projections.
The study also proposes a mixed funding plan for new 
public employees as a solution for problems involving con-
tributions to funds that may be experienced by the Pension 
Regimes for Government Workers (Regimes Próprios de 
Previdência Social - RPPSs). The rationale for this propo-
sal emerged from the observation of the political context in 
which the RPPSs are inserted into states and municipalities 
and into the peculiarities of public sector pension schemes.
The analytical and mathematical system developed in 
this study includes mechanisms typically used in actuarial 
valuations. Based on the parameters chosen, this system 
should reflect the value of the mathematical reserve and of 
the projections for annual pension revenues and expenditu-
res – both individual and collective – of the RPPS benefi-
ciaries. These techniques can be observed in several studies, 
such as Vilanova (1969), Bowers, Gerber, Hickman, Jones 
and Nesbitt (1986), Jordan (1967) and Galé (1977). To per-
form these simulations, data regarding the RPPS beneficia-
ries in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil for the month of 
November 2011 were used. Accordingly, any and all results 
presented in this study are restricted to the pension reality 
of the state of Rio Grande do Sul and cannot be generalized 
to other federal entities in Brazil because the only database 
analyzed belonged to that state.
The Brazilian states are currently responsible for main-
taining their own public pension systems that guarantee re-
tirement and pension benefits to their public employees. A 
balanced pension system is vital for the fiscal sustainability 
of the federal units. Covering pension deficits leads to in-
creasing budget commitments for these states and results in 
concurrent losses to other operating areas of the state.
Studies indicate that the pension system consumes a 
large portion of Brazilian public savings (Giambiagi, 2009; 
Giambiagi, Zylberstajn, Afonso, Souza, & Zylberstajn, 2007; 
Velloso, Freitas, Caetano, & Cândido, 2013). Caetano (2013) 
shows that the total expenditures of the pension system 
in Brazil account for 11% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and that reforms are necessary with respect to esta-
blishing the minimum age, the formula for calculating death 
pension benefits and benefits indexation rules, particularly 
for the minimum wage policy and for the expansion of RPPS 
reforms, which is the focus of this study.
The effects of public employee pensions on the sustaina-
bility of public finances are also of concern internationally. 
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2014) indicate that it will be necessa-
ry to increase contributions to local and state pension funds 
in the U.S. by 2.5 times over the next 30 years for these pen-
sion plans to remain fully funded. Similarly, Brown, Clerk 
and Rauh (2011) argue that the liabilities held by local and 
state pension systems in the U.S. already exceed their assets.
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The funding of most of these pension funds began in the 
1970s and 1980s at a time when the factors that influence 
this process seemed more favorable. For example, at that 
time, there was a smaller proportion of beneficiaries in rela-
tion to  active worker and there was typically a larger return 
on financial investments (Pinheiro, 2007). 
With the problems thus identified, the present study 
seeks to clarify that implementing and maintaining fun-
ding schemes similar to those of the private sector without 
proper conceptual adequacy for public sector pensions is 
not feasible. For these public sector pension plans, it is ne-
cessary to formulate alternatives that facilitate maintaining 
a funding system for the RPPSs based on the principle of 
respecting the overall context in which all parties are invol-
ved: the federal entity, the public employees and the mana-
gement agency.
This study is divided into four sections, including this 
introduction. Section 2 describes the actuarial methodolo-
gy adopted. In section 3, tests are performed that measure 
whether the assumptions of the life table and wage growth 
adhere to the pension reality in the state of Rio Grande do 
Sul. Section 4 presents individual and collective simula-
tions of the mixed plan in alternative scenarios. Finally, the 
conclusions are discussed in section 5. At the end of this 
article, an appendix describes the mathematical methodo-
logy adopted.1
 2 METHODOLOGY
This study was conducted in two phases: (1) the first 
phase features a study of the legally required minimum and 
maximum actuarial parameters and of the impact that more 
realistic parameters have on the actuarial results; (2) the se-
cond phase develops a mixed funding plan to perform indi-
vidual and collective simulations based on the actual records 
of the RPPS beneficiaries in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.
First, the individual and combined effects of actuarial 
parameters were studied, including life tables and wage 
growth figures that were more closely fitted to reality. Fur-
thermore, there was a discussion as to whether adopting 
the current minimum and maximum parameters establi-
shed by Ordinance no. 403 (2008) reflects the reality of fu-
ture RPPS commitments.
The mixed plan that was created in the second phase 
of this study was developed with the intention of solving 
a serious problem related to public pension funding sche-
mes: adopting contribution rates that are below the per-
centage necessary to be fully funded. This practice com-
promises the solvency of the fund and affects the payment 
of future benefits.
This plan simulates a scenario in which the pension con-
tribution rate of 11% (the minimum required) will be main-
tained for public employees and the corresponding entity. 
At the time when the pension benefit is granted, the reserve 
formed by the sum of the employee’s own contributions, the 
employer’s contribution and the financial return obtained 
will be checked for each public employee. From this calcu-
lation, the value of the benefit that the fund will be able to 
pay out based on the amount that was actually funded for 
that public employee will be calculated. If the benefit that 
the public employee is entitled to exceeds the value of the 
benefit funded, the State Treasury will supplement the di-
fference directly through a transfer to the RPPS; otherwise, 
the equating contribution shall be addressed as outlined in 
Ordinance no. 403 (2008).
Individualized simulations were also performed to che-
ck the value actually funded during the public employee’s 
work period.
Finally, the study used data from the beneficiaries in the 
state of Rio Grande do Sul for the reference period of No-
vember 2011 to collectively examine the assumptions adop-
ted for the individual projections.
The simulations were performed on an actuarial system 
in which the pension policy governing the provision of be-
nefits – and the methods used to verify adherence to the 
biometric and financial assumptions used in the projections 
– was observed.
 3 ACTUARIAL PARAMETERS 
The actuarial parameters can be divided into financial 
and biometric parameters, such as interest rates and life ta-
bles, respectively. The use of these parameters is indispen-
sable in the actuarial valuation processes of pension entities 
because they provide the basic probabilistic tools required 
to generate the valuation process (Vilanova, 1969).
The choice of appropriate actuarial parameters is crucial 
given that the results observed by actuarial valuations in 
funding schemes express the status of the entity and guide 
corrective actions if future financial shortfalls are identified. 
Through Ordinance no. 172 (2005), the MPS began 
requiring the Certificate of Pension Compliance (Certi-
ficado de Regularidade Previdenciária - CRP), which is, 
in summary, a document that attests the entity’s practice 
of routine procedures that are indispensable to pension 
issues of its RPPS.
Currently, Ordinance No. 403 (2008) establishes the 
minimum and maximum parameters to be used in actu-
arial valuations of RPPSs. Table 1 presents some of the 
key parameters provided in the ordinance.
1 If the reader wants the full version of the technical note presented in the appendix, please contact the authors.
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Next, the actuarial parameters required by law will be 
analyzed, in addition to their adequacy for the RPPSs in 
the specific case of the state of Rio Grande do Sul.
 3.1 General Life Table.
The general life table, according to Rodrigues (2008), 
represents the effects of the lifespans of beneficiaries 
on the calculations of costs in public or private pension 
plans. Rodrigues (2008) also indicates that the life table is 
an efficient tool to measure these costs. 
According to a note about the 2010 Census released by 
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Insti-
tuto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística - IBGE, 2010a), 
in 50 years (1960-2010), the life expectancy of Brazilians 
increased 25.4 years, from 48.0 to 73.4 years. By contrast, 
the mean number of children per woman decreased from 
6.3 to 1.9 during this period, which is below the replace-
ment level of the population. These changes altered the 
age pyramid, narrowing the base and widening the top, 
pointing toward an aging population structure that is cha-
racteristic of more developed countries (IBGE, 2010a).
3.1.1 Comparison between Life Tables.
The use of the minimum life table (IBGE-09) is justified by 
the difficulty of performing adherence tests to choose the life ta-
ble most appropriate for the RPPS beneficiary population, whi-
ch is mainly due to the difficulty in obtaining consistent records. 
The IBGE life table is designed by considering the ge-
neral population (IBGE, 2010b) of all Brazilian states and 
municipalities, including parts of the population that are 
unemployed and are unable to access adequate health care 
or even basic sanitation in their homes. 
Longevity conditions specific to public employees from 
entities with some social structure are assumed to be bet-
ter than the average for the general Brazilian population. 
These public employees, in principle, have higher income, 
better hygiene information, better access to healthcare and 
higher levels of nutrition than the average person. Conse-
quently, it is natural to assume that this increased access to 
well-being will yield higher life expectancy for this specific 
group (Beltrão, Pinheiro, & Silva, 2010).
According to Rodrigues (2008), the use of life tables 
with risks that do not represent the real behavior of the co-
vered population  may reduce or increase mathematical re-
serves and costs of benefit plans, which may cause structu-
ral imbalances that are difficult to cover in the short term.
Similarly, RPPS beneficiaries, particularly in large cities, 
likely have general characteristics closer to the population 
participating in private pension plans, i.e., pension funds.
According to this perspective, the minimum parame-
ter used in the actuarial valuation of these funds is the 
American life table, AT-83, a parameter provided by the 
Supplemental Pension Plan Management Council (Con-
selho de Gestão da Previdência Complementar - CGPC) 
Resolution no. 18 (2006). The National Supplemental 
Pension Superintendence (Superintendência Nacional de 
Previdência Complementar - PREVIC) considers this pa-
rameter insufficient and is planning to adopt a more con-
servative update, as described by Mr. Edevaldo Fernandes 
da Silva, director of actuarial accounting and economic 
affairs of PREVIC:
PREVIC wants to adopt a more conservative life table, i.e., 
one that assumes greater longevity of retirees and pensio-
ners, present and future. Currently, the recommended ta-
ble is the AT 83, according to which the median survival 
at age 60 is 22.6 years. (Izaguirre, 2012).
The use of a more conservative table than the AT-83 by 
pension funds is already provided for in review cases of be-
nefit plans because of surplus. For these cases, MPS/CGPC 
Resolution no. 26 (2008) requires the American table, AT-
2000, as a minimum parameter. 
In accordance with another perspective, it can be 
assumed that the life expectancy of public employees 
is proportional to the population covered by Brazilian 
insurance companies. Based on this assumption, the Su-
perintendence of Private Insurance (Superintendência de 
Seguros Privados - SUSEP), by means of Circular Letter 
no. 402 (2010), published a life table with the experience 
of the Brazilian insurance market, the BR-EMSmt; this 
table also has a higher survival rate than that predicted 
by the IBGE-09 table.
The comparison of the life expectancy at age 55 betwe-
en the life tables discussed above is presented in Table 2.
The life expectancy at age 55 in the Brazilian table, BR-
-EMSmt, exceeds that of the AT-83, which justifies the 
PREVIC concern regarding the use of a table that projects 
a higher survival rate than the current rate.
3.1.2 Adherence Test for RPPS-RS.
From the databases of active and retired public employees 
of the state of Rio Grande do Sul (RS), annual tests were per-
formed between 2006 and 2011 to identify which life table was 
more statistically appropriate for use in the actuarial projec-
tions related to the RPPS of this state.
2 Only male life tables were selected, except for the IBGE-09 table, which includes both genders.
ITEM DESCRIPTION PARAMETER LEVEL
A General Life Table IBGE-09 Minimum 
B Actual Annual Wage Growth 1.0% Minimum
Source: Ministry of the Social Security. Prepared by the authors.
Table 1   Actuarial parameters set forth in Ordinance 
no. 403 (2008)
AGE BIOMETRIC TABLE2 LIFE EXPECTANCY
55 IBGE-09, MF 25.0
55 BR-EMSmt 27.1
55 AT-83, M 26.8
55 AT-2000, M 28.9
Source: MPS, SUSEP, Society of Actuaries (SOA). Prepared by the authors.
Tabela 2   Comparison between biometric tables
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Some life tables more common in actuarial studies were 
chosen to test the adherence of these tables with the database 
available for this study. By applying the distribution of mor-
tality rates per age in each of the tables to the group of living 
beneficiaries, the expected mean death rate per year can be 
projected and compared with actual deaths to determine whi-
ch tables have expected mean death rates that are closer to the 
observed rate. Table 3 presents the expected number of deaths 
according to the life tables and the actual number of deaths 
between 2006 and 2011.
According to Tables 3 and 4, life tables AT-2000, M, 
BR-EMSmt, AT-83, M and RP-2000, M were selected to 
perform the final adherence test because they had the 
four smallest deviations from the mean. 
The chi-square test was chosen to determine which 
of the four previously selected tables were significant at 
the 5% level. The null hypothesis is that the life table 
chosen represents the true occurrence of deaths in the 
group of beneficiaries and the alternative hypothesis re-
jects the table, i.e., the table chosen does not represent 
the occurrence of deaths. The hypothesis test consists 
of the observation of Type I error, i.e., rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is true.
The chi-square test (Bussab & Morettin, 2002) tests 
whether the frequency with which a particular event ob-
served empirically deviates significantly or not from the 
frequency at which it is expected.
Typically, the chi-square test becomes stricter as the 
number of studied classes increases; thus, the process 
was only accepted with a small number of age ranges, 
and extreme ages were eliminated because they did not 
fit any of the predefined life tables.
At the end of the tests, six age ranges were used, each 
covering a 10-year span, discarding extreme ages, begin-
ning from the range between 31 and 40 years and ending 
with the range between 81 and 90 years, regardless of the 
gender of the beneficiaries. This distribution, with six 
age ranges, provides an adherence test with five degrees 
of freedom.
The final result of the test indicated that only life ta-
ble AT-2000, M(+1) was adherent, i.e., aggregated over a 
year at a significance level of 5%. Aggregating a life table 
means aggregating mortality rates and, consequently, re-
ducing the projected life expectancy. Figure 1 shows the 
adherence test of life table AT-2000, males, aggregated 
for one year.
This initial process is basically a filter to determine 
which life tables are adequate to test adherence. Table 4 
presents the percent deviation of each of the mortality 
tables from actual deaths.
LIFE TABLE YEAR
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
AT-49, M 3898 4081 4277 4477 4645 4876
GAM-83, M 2862 3006 3164 3326 3465 3652
AT-83, M 2395 2509 2632 2758 2865 3011
AT-2000, M 1892 1984 2084 2185 2273 2391
UP-94-M 2620 2756 2904 3057 3188 3364
GAM-94, M 2436 2563 2701 2843 2965 3129
RP-2000, M 2400 2529 2671 2819 2947 3117
GKM-95, M 3308 3469 3645 3823 3979 4187
IBGE-09, MF 3116 3243 3376 3509 3621 3778
BR-EMSmt 2362 2469 2584 2701 2801 2936
ACTUAL 1909 2370 2283 2455 2518 2660
Source: MPS, SUSEP, SOA. Prepared by the authors.
Table 3  Expected and actual number of deaths per year
LIFE TABLE YEAR
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MEAN
AT-49, M 104% 72% 87% 82% 84% 83% 86%
GAM-83, M 50% 27% 39% 35% 38% 37% 38%
AT-83, M 25% 6% 15% 12% 14% 13% 14%
AT-2000, M -1% -16% -9% -11% -10% -10% -9%
UP-94-M 37% 16% 27% 25% 27% 26% 26%
GAM-94, M 28% 8% 18% 16% 18% 18% 18%
RP-2000, M 26% 7% 17% 15% 17% 17% 16%
GKM-95, M 73% 46% 60% 56% 58% 57% 58%
IBGE-09, MF 63% 37% 48% 43% 44% 42% 46%
BR-EMSmt 24% 4% 13% 10% 11% 10% 12%
Source: MPS, SUSEP, SOA. Prepared by the authors.
Table 4   Percent deviation from actual deaths
Prepared by the authors.
 Figure 1   Adherence Test – table AT-2000, M (+1) (2010)
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Even with the conditions imposed on the adherence 
test, the method rejected years 2006 and 2008, and in the 
other years, for acceptance, aggregating table AT-2000, M 
was necessary, as Table 5 shows.
The RPPSs, in turn, will suffer the consequences of this 
volatility in the accounts. Sometimes, the benefit projec-
ted during the activity period differs greatly in value from 
the benefit  actually paid at the time of retirement.
These distortions are caused by class gains provided 
for several reasons. The following news regarding the em-
ployees of the municipality of Curitiba is an example:
The City Council of Curitiba yesterday granted a raise 
of 8.6% to municipal teachers. Added to the raise of 
10% granted to public employees last week, these te-
achers will have, overall, a pay raise of approximately 
19%. This raise shall be paid on this month’s payroll 
(Boreki, 2012). 
These advances, adjustments or readjustments, as 
discussed in the news, can be politically and legally 
reproduced in other federal entities. Without making 
judgments as to their fairness, the fact to be noted is the 
disproportionate gap that a public employee benefiting 
from advances adds to the RPPS pension commitments. 
In the situation described by the news, a teacher who 
is close to retirement will have their benefits increased 
by 19%, without any possibility that contributions made 
while they were active – by the employee and by the 
entity – will have been sufficient according to the new 
commitment.
The increase of the commitment made by the RPPS is 
even more complicated in relation to beneficiaries enti-
tled to parity; in such cases, the benefit increase directly 
impacts pension charges, making contributions necessary 
to afford the new commitment.
With parity, any adjustment or restructuring granted 
to active public employees is immediately reflected in 
equal proportion for RPPS retirees and pensioners. It is 
important to note that Constitutional Amendment no. 41 
(2003) eliminated parity for employees who entered pu-
blic service after the date of its promulgation.
Regarding public employees who will not be entitled 
to parity when they retire, there would be, in theory, a 
greater predictability of the value of their benefits be-
cause the benefits would only undergo inflation adjust-
ment, and this procedure is common in pension fund 
regulations.
In practice, this situation may not occur, given the 
possibility that the entity grants parity to the active pu-
blic employee, even after the advent of Constitutional 
Amendment no. 41 (2003), which constitutionally obli-
gates them to grant only the adjustment of benefits to 
preserve their actual value, i.e., grant the adjustment in 
the same proportion to retirees and pensioner as a dis-
cretionary matter. 
Other factors at times change even the shortfalls of pu-
blic employee retirement funds, such as with teachers who 
assume the roles of principals, administrators or course 
coordinators who, by means of Act no. 11.301 (2006), ac-
quire the rights to special retirement with corresponding 
reductions in the contribution period.
The technical tests on the available records suggest that 
mortality table AT-2000, M aggregated in a year best represents 
the survival rate of the beneficiaries of the RPPS in the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul.
 3.2 Actual Wage Growth.
According to Ordinance no. 403 (2008), the minimum 
actual growth rate of the wage of public employees throu-
ghout their career that can be adopted by the RPPS is 1% 
annually. However, the bylaws of some entities set forth 
timely benefits, such as three-year and five-year premiu-
ms for their employees, and the granting of these rights 
may lead to higher growth than the minimum parameter 
required by the Ministry.
It is worth clarifying a common conceptual error 
about the effects that wage growth may have on the fun-
ding scheme. It is natural to think that because the con-
tribution level is proportional to the gains of a public em-
ployee, that employee would have no practical effect on 
the funding process because if the employee increases the 
base and the commitment, then the income would also 
increase. However, as demonstrated below, this effect is 
not null. The wage variation during the activity period 
will produce significant effects on the funding process, 
implying an increase of the RPPS commitment.
In addition to the increase in remuneration obtained 
during the career plan progress of public employees (timely 
benefits and promotions), they receive pay raises resulting 
from collective labor agreements that frequently outweigh 
inflationary adjustments, i.e., that represent a real gain.
The Brazilian democratic electoral process provides a 
singular aspect to entities with respect to human resour-
ces management that does not include predictability. Un-
like the private sector, the public sector cyclically elects a 
new director who may not uphold the human resources 
policy of their predecessor. The results of this process can 
be observed in the contract cycles of public employees 
and wage adjustments.
YEAR RESULT COMPOUNDING
2006 Rejected -
2007 Accepted 2 years
2008 Rejected -
2009 Accepted 1 year
2010 Accepted 1 year
2011 Accepted 1 year
Prepared by the authors.
Table 5   Test results on life table AT-2000, M
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Considering that there is likely to be suppressed de-
mand and a favorable economic momentum at the na-
tional level in this context, the occurrence at any time of 
events similar to those discussed herein may nevertheless 
compromise the funding of the RPPSs to a large extent.
3.2.1 Wage Growth of Rio Grande do Sul Public 
Employees.
To estimate the actual growth rate of the wage of active pu-
blic employees throughout their working lives, and therefore to 
determine whether the use of the minimum parameter requi-
red by law is suitable to the reality of the RPPS of the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul, data on public employees in the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul were analyzed. 
Only public employees were considered in the calculation 
because military employees have their own specific pension 
fund. The main employment categories of the state were cho-
sen and represent 88.5% of the active public employees: tea-
chers, general staff, civil police, Department of Correctional 
Services (Superintendência dos Serviços Penitenciários - SUSE-
PE) and technical-scientific employees. This distribution can 
be observed in Table 6.
In the wage growth estimate, career progression due to 
promotions and timely benefits in the form of three-year pre-
miums were assumed. Under the law that regulates public 
service in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the three-year pre-
miums are 3% – i.e., every three years, the wage of the public 
employee is increased by 3% over the basic salary – with the 
exception of teachers, whose three-year premium is 5%.
To obtain the mean wage growth, the wages of the actual 
positions from the categories listed above were used on two 
occasions: 2002 and 2012. In this time span of 10 years, it was 
considered that (a) public employees had 3 three-year pre-
miums and (b) the career progression was proportional to the 
time elapsed and to the total time in office for retirement pur-
poses. For example, a technical-scientific employee was hired 
in 2002; until 2012, they incorporated 3 three-year premiums 
(9% over the basic salary) and received a promotion (the ca-
reer consisting of four levels, and to reach the final level, three 
promotions are required).
Table 7 shows the calculation of wage growth based on the 
main categories.
Columns 3-5 show the value of the basic wage and the 
other wage portions totaling the minimum wage inherent 
to the position at current values . Columns 6-7 show the in-
crease resulting from incorporating the three-year premiu-
ms. Column 8 presents the wage corrected by the National 
Broad Consumer Price Index (Índice Nacional de Preços 
CATEGORIES NUMBER OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES %
General Staff 19,958 20.0%
Tech.-Scientific  1,984  2.0%
Teachers 56,713 56.9%
Civil Police  5,510  5.5%
SUSEPE  4,002  4.0%
Others 11,469 11.5%
Total 99,636 100.0%
Source: State Revenue Service of RS. Prepared by the authors.
Table 6  Number of active public employees in the main categories of the state of Rio Grande do Sul (RS)
CATEGORY
(1)
PERIOD
(2)
BASIC 
WAGE (R$)
(3)
OTHER 
PAYMENTS 
(R$)
(4)
WAGE WITHOUT 
THREE-YEAR 
PREMIUM
(5)
THREE-YEAR 
PREMIUM
(6)
WAGE WITH 
THREE-YEAR 
PREMIUM
(7)
CORRECTED
WAGE
(8)
MEAN 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH
(9)
General Staff 2002 215.99 - 215.99 - 215.99 413.22 
7.05%
2012 427.23 370.00 797.23 9% 835.68 835.68 
Technical-
Scientific 
Employees
2002 1,302.15 - 1,302.15 - 1,302.15 2,518.17 
2.82%
2012 2,811.85 315.42 3,127.27 9% 3,380.34 3,380.34 
Teachers 2002 310.40 44.54 354.94 - 354.94 683.40 
3.89%
2012 884.10 - 884.10 15% 1,016.72 1,016.72 
Civil Police 2002 365.61 676.59 1,042.20 - 1,042.20 2,024.13 
2.84%
2012 824.27 1,829.87 2,654.14 9% 2,728.32 2,728.32 
SUSEPE 2002 247.49 458.00 705.49 - 705.49 1,370.18 
5.64%
2012 743.19 1,649.88 2,393.07 9% 2,459.96 2,459.96 
Note: The data used for the calculation of the corrected wage (column 8) and mean annual growth (column 9) refer to the following: in 2002, to Decem-
ber/01 and, in 2012, to different times, namely, General Staff and SUSEPE – April/12, Technical-Scientific Employees – July/12, Teachers – May/12, Civil 
Police – August/12.
Source: State Revenue Service of RS. Prepared by the authors.
Table 7   Annual wage growth of public employees from RS
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ao Consumidor Amplo - IPCA) until August/2012. Finally, 
column 9 shows the mean annual wage growth index obtai-
ned by the wage variation for the period analyzed.
To obtain the mean actual wage growth of the cho-
sen categories, growth indices per category were used 
(shown in Table 7) that were weighted by the number of 
public employees that make up each category (shown in 
Table 6), which resulted in a figure of 4.59% per year. It 
must be emphasized that this index refers to the mean ac-
tual wage growth of public employees of the RPPS from 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul and should not be directly 
applied to other RPPSs. 
 4 MIXED PLAN SIMULATIONS 
After reviewing the assumptions used in the actuarial 
calculations, the adoption of a mixed plan for the RPPS was 
simulated. In this mixed plan, during the period when the 
public employee is active, their contributions, the contri-
butions of the entity and financial gains from the invest-
ment of these resources will form a reserve. Based on the 
value of this reserve, the value of the benefit that the fund 
will be able to pay is calculated. If the value of the benefit 
that the public employee is entitled to – in accordance with 
constitutional provisions – exceeds the value of the funded 
benefit, the difference will be covered by transfers from the 
entity to the RPPS. If the value of the constitutional bene-
fit is lower than the funded value, its equalization shall be 
addressed as provided by Ordinance no. 403 (2008). 
The mixed plan is based on the momentary inability 
of most entities that performed mass segregation3 – and 
therefore have financial funds and pension funds – to con-
tribute above the minimum required pension rate of 11% 
(deducted from federal public employees) of the wage con-
tribution of the beneficiaries to the fund. This inability re-
sults because the entity is also responsible for paying retire-
ment and pension benefits for public employees belonging 
to the simple distribution system. Over time, the pension 
expenditure of the entity will be reduced for two reasons: 
the group of current retirees and pensioners will become 
gradually extinct, and  the inflow of new pensions will be 
paid by the funded system.
This simulation considered that the contribution rate will 
remain at 11% equitably between beneficiaries and the enti-
ty, for a total of 22%. Only when the payment of the pension 
benefit begins will the benefit amount that the public em-
ployee or their dependent is entitled to be calculated, whi-
ch was effectively funded. The remaining amount to com-
plement the value of the benefit constitutionally guaranteed 
to the beneficiary or beneficiaries will be borne by the State 
Treasury under a simple distribution financial scheme.
 4.1 Individual Funding.
In this first simulation, for comparison purposes, the 
calculation of the amount actually funded was performed 
for each public employee, with the difference as the state’s 
responsibility. The minimum contribution rate provided by 
law of 11% was adopted for the public employee plus 11% 
for the entity, in addition to the maximum and minimum 
parameters provided by Ordinance no. 403 (2008). The si-
mulation of the constitutional benefit that the public em-
ployee is entitled to, the funded benefit and funding deficit 
are presented in Table 8.
3  According to Ordinance no. 403 (2008), mass segregation is the separation of beneficiaries of the RPPS into different groups that will comprise the financial plan and the pension plan. The first refers to senior 
public employees and is financed by means of distribution. The second provides coverage to employees with less employment time in public service and is funded.
It is projected that the contribution plan is insufficient 
for full funding of the constitutional benefit that the public 
employee will be entitled to at the time of retirement. The 
example described herein uses the mean ages of entry (30 ye-
ars) and retirement (57 years) of the RPPS beneficiaries from 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul together with the mean initial 
public service salary of BRL 1,500.00. The constitutional be-
nefit that such public employees will be entitled to is BRL 
1,753.63 (this value is the mean of the 80% largest salary con-
tributions and not the final payment, which is BRL 1,942.88). 
The contribution plan, by contrast, will fund a mathematical 
reserve that is proportional to a benefit of BRL 1,491.20, or 
85% of the total projected constitutional benefit.
 In the study case, the fund remains responsible for the full 
payment of the benefit to the public employee, BRL 1,753.63, 
which inevitably reveals consecutive actuarial deficits and, as 
observed in actuarial projections, the insolvency of the fund 
for the payment of benefits at a given time.
According to the initial simulation for the effective funding 
of a public employee that joins the RPPS, the required contri-
bution rate should be approximately 25%, which is split betwe-
en the public employee and the entity; this calculation would 
result in 11% for the public employee and 14% for the entity. 
However, the situation is not so simple, as will be shown next.
It is worth emphasizing that this simulation refers to a new 
public employee that joins the entity and not to those that have 
contributed for a long time; the possible effects of class gains, 
ITEM VALUES
Age of Entry 30
Retirement Age 57
Initial Wage (BRL) 1,500.00
Annual Wage Growth 1.0%
Constitutional Benefit at Retirement (BRL) 1,753.63
Funded Benefit (BRL) 1,491.20
Funding Deficit (BRL)  262.42
Note: A percentage of 4.47% destined to cover risk benefits is assumed.
Prepared by the authors.
Table 8  Simulation with parameters of Ordinance no. 
403 (2008)
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as described above, are not projected. For these cases, the cal-
culation is more complicated.
As described before, it is projected that the minimum 
and maximum parameters established by Ordinance no. 403 
(2008) are not in compliance with the RPPS. Because of this 
non-compliance, the projection of the effective funding was 
performed through the same contribution process with ag-
gregation of these parameters.
For this case, the life table AT-2000, M(+1) was chosen, 
replacing the IBGE-09; the wage growth projected became 
4.59% annually, instead of 1%, and the actuarial interest rate 
was reduced from 6.0% to 4.5% annually. The simulation with 
these aggregated parameters is shown in Table 9.
According to the simulation of individual parameter 
changes, the reduction in the interest rate from 6% to 
4.5% per year would produce the greatest effect, with an 
increase of 174.82% in contribution deficits.
With reference to the descriptions in section 3.2 of the 
effects produced by wage growth, the simulation demons-
trates larger deficits in funding, in view of the increase in 
this parameter. In the study case, with the single modifi-
cation of the wage growth projection from 1.0% to 4.59% 
per year, the increase in the deficit is 98.30%.
Because they are not independent effects, the total 
sum of the individual increments of the parameters is 
not equivalent to the combined effect. The added effect of 
the parameters is approximately 247.19%, given that the 
funding deficit increased from 14.96% to 51.96% between 
simulations.
Another way to project the contribution deficit is 
to use simple mathematical reasoning in relation to the 
marked number of RPPS beneficiary teachers. In these 
cases, a total contribution of 22% (public employee plus 
entity) over the wage shall occur for approximately 25 
years of activity, and the payment of 100% of the benefit 
for a mean life expectancy of 35 years shall occur after 
retirement. This calculation certainly cannot be affor-
ded by the fund because 22% is paid to the fund for 25 
years and 100% is payable for 35 years. One possible so-
lution for this equation is for the fund to reach high pro-
fitability levels from fund investment, which is unlikely, 
as previously observed.
According to the assumptions defined as more adhe-
rent to the RPPS of the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Table 
9) and the mean records used in the individual projec-
tions, Figure 2 compares the contribution period (in ye-
ars) with the portion of the benefit that will be effectively 
funded (as a percentage). Two distinct contribution plans 
were simulated: the first considers the total rate of 22% 
(11% for the public employee and 11% for the entity), 
the minimum required by the pension law. The second 
establishes a contribution level of 26.5% (13.25% for the 
public employee and 13.25% for the entity), which is the 
current situation of the state of Rio Grande do Sul.
In this new simulation, with actuarial parameters ag-
gregated as described above, the result is bleak. Of the 
total projected constitutional benefit, BRL 3,132.77, it is 
estimated that only 48% will be funded, i.e., BRL 1,504.87. 
For the effective funding of the total benefit, the required 
rate shall be 41% of wages, 11% from the public employee 
and 30% from the entity, in this example.
Numerous simulations can be performed that will in-
dicate that the funding level of the RPPS will be insuffi-
cient to meet the payment of all public employee pension 
benefits. The parameter changes made  for the second si-
mulation (Table 9) only evidence such a reality, given that 
future commitments will likely be closer to the simulation 
performed with these parameters.
The final projected deficit goes from 15% of the to-
tal benefit, by the initial parameters, to 52% of the total 
benefit, according to the calculation made with more 
conservative assumptions. The effect of each parame-
ter change is ultimately compounded when applied si-
multaneously, considering that these changes are not 
independent.
For illustrative purposes, the impact that each para-
meter would add to the initial funding deficit is demons-
trated in Table 10, if applied individually. 
Item Values
Age of Entry 30
Retirement Age 57
Initial Wage (BRL) 1,500.00
Annual Wage Growth 4.59%
Constitutional Benefit at Retirement (BRL) 3,132.77
Funded Benefit (BRL) 1,504.87
Funding Deficit (BRL) 1,627.90
Prepared by the authors.
Table 9   Simulation with aggregated parameters
Item Initial 
parameter
New 
Parameter
Deficit 
Increase
Life Table IBGE-09 AT-2000(+1)  18.17%
Wage Growth 1.00% 4.59%  98.30%
Interest Rate 6.00% 4.50% 174.82%
Prepared by the authors.
Table 10  Individual effect of parameter changes
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The benefit will not be fully covered by contributions 
and earnings even in the second plan (26.5%) because 
that would require a contribution period of 38 years, at 
least, whereas in the first plan (22%), more than 40 years 
of contribution would be necessary. Both situations of 
such long contribution periods are not found in practice 
because the databases of the state of Rio Grande do Sul 
demonstrate that public employees contribute, on avera-
ge, for 27 years.
For these simulations, financial compensation effects 
were not considered between schemes because such 
compensation typically is not sufficient for the com-
mitments made by the RPPS, which would decrease the 
amount funded by the simulations. 
 4.2 Collective Funding of the State of Rio 
Grande do Sul.
This section analyzes the collective capitalization of pu-
blic employee pensions in the state the Rio Grande do Sul 
based on the new parameters defined as more realistic. 
The pension fund for public employees was created on 
July 15, 2011, with the passage of Complementary Act no. 
13.758 (2011). The current value of the wages of active em-
ployees is BRL 720,627,054.35, after considering all future 
wages of the current group of public employees who belong 
to FUNDOPREV, the funded state pension fund. The com-
mitments of the fund, as well as the percentages relative to 
payroll, are presented in Table 11.
Table 12 shows the earnings that the first contribution 
plan (22%) will yield to the funds.
Prepared by the authors.
 Figure 2   Comparison between contribution time and funded benefit
Commitments Values in BRL % wages
Benefits Granted -  0.00%
Benefits to be Granted 371,928,941.27 42.46%
Benefits to be Granted– Future Generation -  0.00%
Total 371,928,941.27 42.46%
Prepared by the authors.
Table 11   Benefits granted and to be granted from RS pension funds
Income Value in BRL % wages
Contribution of Active Employees  96,350,943.70 11.00%
Contribution of Pensioners  11,157,868.24  1.27%
Pension Compensation  7,438,578.83  0.85%
State Contribution over the Wages of Active Employees  96,350,943.70 11.00%
State Contribution over the Wages of Pensioners -  0.00%
Total 211,298,334.46 24.12%
Prepared by the authors.
Table 12   Income from pension funds in the 22% contribution plan 
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According to Tables 11 and 12, the formation of a mathe-
matical reserve of BRL 160,630,606.81 (BRL 371,928,941.27 
– BRL 211,298,334.46) will be required, i.e., 22.29% over the 
wages of active employees. In this model, the pension fund 
of the state of Rio Grande do Sul will have approximately 37 
years of solvency. Beginning in 2048, it will no longer have 
the funds to afford to pay benefits to its retirees and pensio-
ners, as Figure 3 shows.
This chart shows the pattern of three variables: (a) benefits 
paid to retirees and pensioners; (b) revenue from the contri-
butions of beneficiaries and the State; and (c) fund resources 
(contributions plus earnings). The negative impact on fund 
assets, beginning in the 25th year, will occur with an increase in 
expenses due to the payment of retirement benefits and pen-
sions associated with reduced pension revenue because the 
beneficiaries contribute only over the amount that exceeds the 
maximum limit of benefits from the General Social Security 
System (Regime Geral de Previdência Social - RGPS).
In the second contribution plan (26.5%), revenues will 
increase by BRL 39,416,295.15 (BRL 250,714,629.61 - BRL 
211,298,334.46) based on an increase of 4.5% in the full 
pension rate. Table 13 shows the distribution of revenues 
in this new model, approved by Complementary Act no. 
14016 (2012).
Based on Tables 11 and 13, the deficit amount in the new 
contribution plan of the state of Rio Grande do Sul is BRL 
121,214,311.66 (BRL 371,928,941.27 - BRL 250,714,629.61), 
i.e., 16.82% of active employee wages. The projection indicates 
that by 2051, the resources from pension funds will end, i.e., 
the MILITARY FUNDOPREV and FUNDOPREV will only 
be able to pay the pension benefits for 40 more years before 
they become insolvent.
Revenue Values in BRL % wages
Contribution of Active Employees 116,059,091.28 13.25%
Contribution of Pensioners 11,157,868.24  1.27%
Pension Compensation 7,438,578.83  0.85%
State Contribution over the Wages of Active Employees  116,059,091.28 13.25%
State Contribution over the Wages of Pensioners -  0.00%
Total 250,714,629.61 28.62%
Prepared by the authors.
Table 13  Income from funds in the 26.5% contribution plan 
 Figure 3   RPPS cash flow (22% contribution)
Prepared by the authors.
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In Figure 4, the shape of the fund benefit, revenue and 
resource curves is similar to that shown in Figure 3. The 
difference is that at a contribution level of 26.5%, the pen-
sion revenue is higher, which ensures the solvency of the 
fund for another three years. It is noted that, even with 
the increase of the rate from 22% to 26.5%, the increase in 
pension revenue is not sufficient to maintain the balance 
of the RPPS. 
 5 CONCLUSION
 The biometric and financial assumptions of the 
RPPS actuarial valuation are contained in the minimum 
and maximum parameters set forth in Ordinance no. 
403 (2008). As demonstrated throughout this study, the 
choice of parameters, the IBGE-09 life table and actual 
wage growth of 1% per year, do not reflect the current 
reality that is faced by the pension fund of the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul; the reality, unfortunately, is that the-
se assumptions result in a smaller pension deficit for the 
RPPS of the state.
Thus, this study seeks to provide insight to managers 
of state pension funds so that – together with the res-
ponsible actuary – they can choose the most plausible 
assumptions to maintain the actuarial and financial sus-
tainability of the scheme.
According to the case analyzed from the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul, delegating full payment of pension be-
nefits to the fund, regardless of reciprocal funding, will 
result in the gradual consumption of financial resources 
until they are inevitably extinguished.
In addition, the Rio Grande do Sul case also shows 
that increasing the entity transfer rate will be insuffi-
cient due to the entire context involved, even if applied 
at the very high levels described herein. Furthermore, it 
should be emphasized that higher entity transfer rates 
may prove impossible to implement in practice, whether 
because of legal and tax impediments or because of the 
economic scenario that such entities eventually face.
Insufficient funding of all commitments to RPPS be-
neficiaries is therefore a real projection for the fund in 
this case study. To mitigate this problem, a form of mi-
xed financing, partly funding and partly simple distri-
bution, was suggested. Under this assumption, the fund 
would be responsible for the effectively funded part on 
the individual account of the public employee, and the 
complement, if necessary, to reach the constitutional 
benefit is payable by the entity and financed by simple 
distribution.
It is important to highlight two key aspects of this 
method: first, such financing mechanism does not pre-
vent the benefit from becoming fully funded, whether by 
means of additional contributions or even due to favo-
rable factors over time. In this case, the fund would be 
responsible for 100% of the benefit without the need for 
additional transfers, i.e., the proposed mixed plan for-
mat does not exclude the possibility that the traditional 
mechanism of full funding may be used.
The second important factor is that the fund and – 
indirectly – the entity would not have to address the 
constant pressure to equalize actuarial deficits during 
its management, and in the case of the mixed plan, the 
mathematical reserve is always equivalent to the assets, 
and the plan would be in actuarial balance permanently.
As evidenced in this study, the proposal of a mixed 
plan aims to ensure the continued sustainability of the 
pension fund to prevent it from being liable for the pay-
ment of benefits over its capacity, thus prematurely ex-
tinguishing the fund’s resources, which would be a set-
back for the public employee pension system.
The mixed plan allows the continuation of a funding 
scheme in the RPPS, which adds real financial gains to 
the federal entity over time.
Prepared by the authors.
 Figure 4   RPPS cash flow (26.5% contribution)
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  APPENDIX – DESCRIPTION OF ACTUARIAL METHODOLOGY
 1 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
This technical note aims to establish the technical and actuarial valuation basis of the Pension Regime for Government 
Workers (RPPS), consistent with current legislation, benefit plans and contribution plans.
1.2 The benefit plans, under the law, are structured in the form of “defined benefits” that encompass public employees holding 
permanent offices associated under the RPPS, with their respective state/municipal entity as the sponsor of the plan.
1.3 The methodology of actuarial valuation developed in this technical note establishes:
1.3.1 Current value of obligations of the benefits granted;
1.3.2 Current value of obligations of the benefits to be granted;
1.3.3 Current value of contribution rights;
1.3.4 Current value of financial compensation to be received;
1.3.5 Mathematical provisions.
1.4 The full version of the actuarial methodology adopted is available from the authors upon request. 
